حجة الله البالغة - Shah Waliullah Dehlawiاردو◂ Sources◂ Contents

القسم الأول · المبحث الأول · باب ١١

Deeds Cleaving to the Soul

باب لصوق الأعمال بالنفس وإحصائها عليها
Four movements - springing, returning, clinging, being reckoned

Reference
Book
حجة الله البالغة - شاه ولي الله الدهلوي (م ١١٧٦ هـ)
Bāb
باب ١١ - لصوق الأعمال بالنفس وإحصائها عليها
Place
القسم الأول - المبحث الأول: في أسباب التكليف والمجازاة
Previous bābs
باب ٨ ← باب ٩ ← باب ١٠
Next bāb
باب ١٢ - ارتباط الأعمال بالهيئات النفسانية
Edition
ed. سعيد أحمد البالنبوري - Dār Ibn Kathīr, Beirut; 3rd printing, 1438 AH / 2017 CE

The link: bāb 8 held that obligation requires requital, and bāb 10 showed where the impulse to act comes from. This bāb supplies the link between them: once a deed is done, where does it go? And the answer is that it goes nowhere - it stays in the soul.

The bāb in brief
  1. The ground, from transmission: ﴿وَكُلَّ إِنسَانٍ أَلْزَمْنَاهُ طَائِرَهُ فِي عُنُقِهِ﴾; the hadith qudsī إنما هي أعمالُكم أُحصيها عليكم; and النفسُ تتمنّى وتشتهي، والفرجُ يصدّقُ ذلك ويكذّبُه.
  2. The claim in one sentence, with four verbs: deeds done with settled intent and character traits firmly rooted تنبعثُ من أصلِ النفسِ الناطقةِ، ثم تعودُ إليها، ثم تتشبّثُ بذيلِها، وتُحصَى عليها. The whole rest of the bāb is these four unfolded, in that order.
  3. Springing: every cause in bāb 10 operates لا تكونُ إلا حسبَ ما تعطيه الجِبِلّةُ - so the reference is back to the soul's root in any case, بوسطٍ أو بغيرِ وسطٍ. And for evidence, two examples of inference: a knower and a physician, each reading a future off a temperament.
  4. Returning: let an act be repeated and اعتادتْه النفسُ، وسهُلَ صدورُه منها, and the soul قبِلَت لونَه - takes on its colour. And every single one of those acts has a share in the effect, وإن دقَّ وخفيَ مكانُه. The hadith of the reed mat belongs here.
  5. Clinging: the soul is at first هيولانية - wholly empty; then day by day it comes out from potency into act. Every later state has a مُعِدّ, a preparer, before it, and the preparers form an ordered chain - so today's form carries the ruling of every preparer that came before.
  6. Being reckoned - and here the register changes: فسِرُّه على ما وجدتُه بالذوقِ. In the lofty expanse each man has a form; an act makes that form expand, بلا اختيارٍ منه. Which is why in the Return deeds sometimes appear reckoned from above (the reading of the scrolls) and sometimes clinging to the limbs themselves (the speaking of hands and feet).

The real point: "reckoning" in this bāb is no external ledger. The deed is its own record, and that record is kept in the soul itself - مستصحِبٌ في هيئةِ النفسِ الموجودةِ اليومَ حكمُ كلِّ مُعِدٍّ قبلَها. m: طائرَه في عنقِه - at the neck, not in the hand; fastened on, not handed over. Even so the door is not shut: the text itself keeps two exceptions - the perishing of the power, and a form arriving from above that rearranges the order.


1

The ground: one verse and two hadiths

The bāb opens with transmission and no preamble, and the whole theme is already in the verse:

قرآن - الإسراء: ١٣-١٤

﴿وَكُلَّ إِنسَانٍ أَلْزَمْنَاهُ طَائِرَهُ فِي عُنُقِهِ وَنُخْرِجُ لَهُ يَوْمَ الْقِيَامَةِ كِتَابًا يَلْقَاهُ مَنشُورًا ۝ اقْرَأْ كِتَابَكَ كَفَىٰ بِنَفْسِكَ الْيَوْمَ عَلَيْكَ حَسِيبًا﴾

Two phrases became the chapter's title: ألزمناهُ … في عنقِه gives لصوق (cleaving), and كتاباً … حسيباً gives إحصاء (reckoning). And the last clause carries the most weight: كفى بنفسِكَ اليومَ عليكَ حسيباً - the reckoner is no one else; your own soul suffices against you.

حدیث قدسی

إنما هي أعمالُكم أُحصيها عليكم، ثم أُوفّيكم إياها، فمن وجدَ خيراً فليحمدِ اللهَ، ومن وجدَ غيرَ ذلك فلا يلومنَّ إلا نفسَه.

حاشیہ

رواه مسلمٌ (مشكاة حديث ٢٣٢٧، بابُ الاستغفارِ، كتابُ الدعواتِ).

The verb وجدَ repays attention: "finds", not "is given". And أوفّيكم إياها - those same deeds are paid back in full; not something else in exchange for them.

حدیث

النفسُ تتمنّى وتشتهي، والفرجُ يصدّقُ ذلك ويكذّبُه.

The third hadith looks at first like it belongs elsewhere. But it lays a hand exactly where this bāb stands: there is longing and appetite in the soul, and the limb both confirms it and belies it. That is, between the inward and the act there is a relation, and the relation runs both ways. m - springing (soul to act) and returning (act to soul) - and the hadith puts both in one sentence. The text brings this same hadith back in باب ١٢.

2

The claim: one sentence, four verbs

And now the bāb's central sentence, which announces its own whole order:

اعلمْ أن الأعمالَ التي يقصدُها الإنسانُ قصداً مؤكداً، والأخلاقَ التي هي راسخةٌ فيه - تنبعثُ من أصلِ النفسِ الناطقةِ، ثم تعودُ إليها، ثم تتشبّثُ بذيلِها، وتُحصَى عليها.

Notice first the bound on the subject, which comes at the very start: يقصدُها الإنسانُ قصداً مؤكداً and راسخةٌ فيه. The matter is not every motion a man happens to make, but acts of settled intent and character that has set.

Then four verbs, and they are the chapter's four parts: تنبعثُ → تعودُ → تتشبّثُ → تُحصَى. The text then opens all four with أما … وأما … وأما … وأما, one by one, in exactly that order.

Plate I

The journey of a deed: out of the root, and back to it

﴿وَكُلَّ إِنسَانٍ أَلْزَمْنَاهُ طَائِرَهُ فِي عُنُقِهِ﴾ - fastened at the neck, not handed over. And the reckoner does not arrive from outside either: كفى بنفسِكَ اليومَ عليكَ حسيباً.

The four stages and their order are from the text’s own sentence; the English lines beneath them are mine. Note that the sequence does not travel onward - it returns to where it began.


3

First movement: springing - the deed rises from the root

The argument for the first movement gathers up the whole previous chapter into a single conclusion:

فلمّا عرفتَ أن للملكيةِ والبهيميةِ واجتماعِهما أقساماً، ولكلِّ قسمٍ حكماً، وغلبةَ المزاجِ الطبيعيِّ، والانصباغَ من الملائكةِ والشياطينِ، ونحوَ ذلك من الأسبابِ - لا تكونُ إلا حسبَ ما تعطيه الجِبِلّةُ، وتحصلُ فيه المناسبةُ، فلذلك كان المرجعُ إلى أصلِ النفسِ، بوسطٍ أو بغيرِ وسطٍ.

The list is familiar: bāb 9's eight classes, and bāb 10's temperament and dyeing. Palanpuri states the link outright in a footnote - من الأسبابِ: أي أسبابِ الخواطرِ كما تقدَّم في البابِ العاشرِ. And the shape of the argument is this: all those causes operate only as far as innate nature allows and where المناسبة obtains. So the reference is back to the root regardless.

And the last two words open the whole question. The footnote glosses them:

حاشیہ

بوسَطٍ: أي إن نُظِرَ إلى الأسبابِ، وبغيرِ وسَطٍ: أي إن نُظِرَ إلى الجِبِلّةِ فحسبُ. (سندي)

That qualification saves the bāb from determinism, in just the way "acquisition" saved bāb 9. The text is not saying the causes have no effect; it is saying that wherever the chain of causes ends, it ends at the root. m: look at the intervening links and it is "through an intermediary"; drop the chain and look at the root alone and it is "without one". Both describe the same fact.

And now two examples, both of the same kind - in each, someone is reading a future off a temperament:

ألستَ ترى المخنَّثَ يُخلَقُ في أولِ عمرِه على مزاجٍ ركيكٍ، فيستدلُّ به العارفُ على أنه إن شبَّ على مزاجِه وجبَ أن يعتادَ بعاداتِ النساءِ، ويتزيّا بزيِّهنَّ، وينتحلَ رسومَهنَّ.

وكذلك يُدرِكُ الطبيبُ أن الطفلَ إن شبَّ على مزاجِه، ولم يفجأْه عارضٌ، كان قويّاً فارهاً، أو ضعيفاً ضارعاً.

In both examples the real matter is inference, not a ruling. In the first the subject is العارف and the verb يستدلُّ; in the second the subject is الطبيب and the verb يُدرِكُ. Each reads ahead from an initial temperament, and each carries the same condition - إن شبَّ على مزاجِه, and in the second explicitly ولم يفجأْه عارضٌ. m, and the physician's case completes the argument just as well. It is not a legal or moral verdict, and the bāb's claim does not rest on it.

4

Second movement: returning - the deed comes back and leaves its colour

وأما العودُ إليه: فلأن الإنسانَ إذا عملَ عملاً فأكثرَ منه، اعتادتْه النفسُ، وسهُلَ صدورُه منها، ولم يحتجْ إلى رَويّةٍ وتجشُّمِ داعيةٍ، فلا جرمَ أن النفسَ تأثّرت منه، وقبِلَت لونَه.

The sign is not that the act is being done; the sign is that it has become easy. رَويّة (deliberation) and تجشُّمِ داعيةٍ (forcing up a motive) - when both of these fall away, the soul has taken the colour. The footnote defines the first: النظرُ والتفكيرُ في الأمورِ، وهي خلافُ البديهةِ.

And then the sentence that makes this chapter morally serious:

ولا جرمَ أن لكلِّ عملٍ من تلك الأعمالِ المتجانسةِ مدخلاً في ذلك التأثُّرِ، وإن دقَّ وخفيَ مكانُه.

"Every one" - that is the phrase bearing the weight. The colour does not go on at a stroke; each one of those homogeneous acts has a share in it, وإن دقَّ وخفيَ مكانُه - however minute the share and however hidden its place. m where Sindhī likened thoughts to raindrops: drops gather into a will, and wills gather into a colour.

And on this the text brings a hadith that turns the gradualness into a picture:

حدیث

تُعرَضُ الفتنُ على القلوبِ كالحصيرِ عوداً عوداً، فأيُّ قلبٍ أُشرِبَها نُكِتَت فيه نكتةٌ سوداءُ، وأيُّ قلبٍ أنكرَها نُكِتَت فيه نكتةٌ بيضاءُ، حتى تصيرَ على قلبينِ: أبيضَ مثلِ الصَّفا، فلا تضرُّه فتنةٌ ما دامتِ السمواتُ والأرضُ؛ والآخَرُ أسودُ مُربادّاً كالكوزِ مُجَخِّياً، لا يعرفُ معروفاً ولا يُنكِرُ منكراً إلا ما أُشرِبَ من هواهُ.

The fineness of the image comes out in the footnote. عوداً عوداً has two readings: the reeds of a mat one by one, or simply "time after time". And on مُجَخِّياً the footnote says the thing that opens the whole hadith:

حاشیہ

مُجَخِّياً: اسمُ مفعولٍ، أي معكوساً … كما لا يستقرُّ الماءُ في الكوزِ المائلِ، كذلك القلبُ لا يَعي خيراً.

Both images say one thing, from opposite directions. A mat is woven - reed by reed, and at the end there is a whole fabric. An upended jug does not fill - let the water keep coming, nothing stays. m: returning (each reed joining) and clinging (the settled form persisting, until it will not take anything new at all).

5

Third movement: clinging - the chain of preparers, and two exceptions

The third movement is finer than the second. In returning, the act lays its colour on the soul; in clinging, that colour travels forward. And the argument starts from an empty soul:

وأما التشبُّثُ بذيلِها: فلأن النفسَ في أولِ أمرِها تُخلَقُ هيولانيةً فارغةً عن جميعِ ما تنصبغُ به، ثم لا تزالُ تخرجُ من القوّةِ إلى الفعلِ يوماً فيوماً.

حاشیہ

الهيولانيُّ: ما كان في بدايةِ أمرِه … والنفسُ الهيولانيةُ: ما كانت فارغةً عن جميعِ ما تنصبغُ به.

And now the sentence this whole section stands on:

وكلُّ حالةٍ متأخّرةٍ لها مُعِدٌّ من قبلِها، والمُعِدّاتُ كلُّها سلسلةٌ مترتّبةٌ، لا يتقدّمُ متأخّرُها على متقدّمٍ، مستصحِبٌ في هيئةِ النفسِ الموجودةِ اليومَ حكمُ كلِّ مُعِدٍّ قبلَها، وإن خفيَ عليها بسببِ اشتغالِها بما هو خارجٌ منها.

The word مُعِدّ is technical, and the footnote settles it with two examples:

حاشیہ

المُعِدُّ … هو من أقسامِ العلّةِ الناقصةِ، وهو ما كان عدمُه بعد وجودِه موقوفاً عليه للشيءِ، كسلسلةِ الأعدادِ والأقدامِ: فإن وجودَ الخمسةِ - مثلاً - موقوفٌ على عدمِ الأربعةِ بعدَ وجودِها، وكذا القدمُ الثاني يتوقّفُ على عدمِ القدمِ الأولِ.

The footsteps make it clearest. A second step cannot be taken until the first has been put down - and the first step no longer exists. Yet where you now stand is exactly what that first step gave you. m: the earlier preparer has passed, but its ruling travels along in today's form. And the text adds that a man is usually unaware of it - وإن خفيَ عليها بسببِ اشتغالِها بما هو خارجٌ منها.

And now the sentence without which this bāb would be despair:

اللهمَّ إلا أن يفنى حاملُ القوّةِ المنبعثةِ تلك الأعمالُ منها، كما ذكرنا في الشيخِ والمريضِ، أو تهجمَ عليها هيئةٌ من فوقِها نظامَها كالتغيُّرِ المذكورِ.

Two exceptions: one from below - the very power those acts sprang from perishes (and the reference is again to bāb 10's old man and sick man); and one from above - a form arrives and rearranges the order itself. And on each, a verse:

قرآن - هود: ١١٤

﴿إِنَّ الْحَسَنَاتِ يُذْهِبْنَ السَّيِّئَاتِ﴾

قرآن - الزمر: ٦٥

﴿لَئِنْ أَشْرَكْتَ لَيَحْبَطَنَّ عَمَلُكَ﴾

And in his summary Palanpuri casts both exceptions into entirely concrete cases:

حاشیہ

اللهمَّ إلا في صورتينِ: الأولى: أن تفنى القوّةُ الباعثةُ على المعاصي، كما في الشيخِ والمريضِ؛ والثانيةُ: عرضت هيئةٌ غيّرت نظامَها، كمن حجَّ وزارَ البيتَ فهدمَ ما كان قبلَه، أو أشركَ - والعياذُ بالله - فحبِطَ عملُه.

The chain is continuous, but it is not locked.

6

Fourth movement: being reckoned - and here the author says “by tasting”

At the opening of the fourth part the register changes, and the change is not to be passed over:

وأما الإحصاءُ عليها: فسِرُّه على ما وجدتُه بالذوقِ أن في الحيّزِ الشاهقِ تظهرُ صورةٌ لكلِّ إنسانٍ بما يعطيه النظامُ الفوقانيُّ، والتي ظهرت في قصةِ الميثاقِ شعبةٌ منها.

The first three movements were stated in the language of reasoning and experience; this fourth comes بالذوق. And the footnote fetches the definition of "tasting" from the author's own other book:

حاشیہ

قال الإمامُ في التفهيماتِ: الذوقُ … هو العلمُ الذي ينزلُ عليه من حيثُ ينزلُ عليه سِرُّ وجودِه. وقال العلامةُ السنديُّ: اصطلاحُ المصنِّفِ: أن رؤيةَ الشيءِ بالنورِ الحاصلِ من حظيرةِ القدسِ، ومعرفتَه به، يقالُ له: الذوقُ.

And the footnote also identifies الحيّز الشاهق - an identification that ties this bāb to bāb 2:

حاشیہ

الحَيِّزُ: المكانُ … والشاهقُ: العالي … والحيّزُ الشاهقُ: عالَمُ المثالِ.

That one line changes the whole scene. The "lofty expanse" is no new world; it is bāb 2's world of images - the one where meanings take form. m: every man has a form there, and deeds are entered on that form. The "book" stops being a metaphor without becoming paper - it is a form in the world of images. And the footnote recalls that the Covenant is mentioned at آل عمران ٨١ and الأعراف ١٧٢.

And now the sentence that most changes what "reckoning" means:

فإذا وُجِدَ هذا الشخصُ انطبقتِ الصورةُ عليه، واتّحدت معه، فإذا عملَ عملاً انشرحت هذه الصورةُ بذلك العملِ انشراحاً طبيعياً بلا اختيارٍ منه.

انشراحاً طبيعياً بلا اختيارٍ منه - the entry is not a decision but a natural process. As a seal leaves its impression by being pressed, not by anyone willing it.

فربما تظهرُ في المعادِ أن أعمالَها مُحصاةٌ عليها من فوقِها، ومنه: قراءةُ الصُّحُفِ؛ وربما تظهرُ أن أعمالَها فيها متشبّثةٌ بأعضائِها، ومنه: نُطقُ الأيدي والأرجلِ.

This is a reconciliation, and a fine one. The Qur'an carries both pictures: in places scrolls are opened (from outside), in places hands and feet speak for themselves (from within). The text does not treat them as rivals but as two appearances of one fact - because the form is a single form, at once above and united with the person. m; the right one is from which side it is appearing.

7

“Write the deed as it is” - and Ghazālī on the Tablet

ثم كلُّ صورةِ عملٍ مُفصِحةٌ عن ثمرتِه في الدنيا والآخرةِ، وربما تتوقّفُ الملائكةُ في تصويرِه، فيقولُ اللهُ تعالى: اكتبوا العملَ كما هو.

Angels "pausing" sounds odd at first. The footnote gives the reason, and the reason lies in how writing was once done:

حاشیہ

كانت قاعدةُ الكتابةِ في الزمانِ الماضي بالتصويرِ، فربما لا يمكنُ التصويرُ؛ مثلاً قال رجلٌ: اللهمَّ لك الحمدُ عددَ أقطارِ الأمطارِ، فيقالُ لهم: اكتبوا العملَ كما هو. (سندي)

That is: to write was to draw - and "praise to the number of the raindrops" cannot be drawn. The footnote supplies the hadith too, in which ten angels raced for that phrase and did not know how to record it, until they took the matter up above.

One verbal difference should be noted here. The text quotes God's word as اكتبوا العملَ كما هو; the hadith brought in the footnote has اكتبوها كما قال عبدي. The sense is one, the wording is not - and the text here is giving the sense rather than quoting the hadith's words.

And at the chapter's close the author quotes Ghazālī at length, on the Preserved Tablet:

كلُّ ما قدّرَه اللهُ تعالى من ابتداءِ خلقِ العالمِ إلى آخرِه مسطورٌ مُثبَتٌ في خلقٍ خلقَه اللهُ تعالى، يُعبَّرُ عنه تارةً باللوحِ، وتارةً بالكتابِ المبينِ، وتارةً بإمامٍ مبينٍ، كما وردَ في القرآنِ.

ولا تظننَّ أن ذلك اللوحَ من خشبٍ أو حديدٍ أو عظمٍ، وأن الكتابَ من كاغدٍ أو ورقٍ، بل ينبغي أن تفهمَ قطعاً أن لوحَ اللهِ لا يشبهُ لوحَ الخلقِ، وكتابَ اللهِ لا يشبهُ كتابَ الخلقِ، كما أن ذاتَه وصفاتِه لا تُشبهُ ذاتَ الخلقِ وصفاتِهم.

فاعلمْ أن ثبوتَ المقاديرِ في اللوحِ المحفوظِ يُضاهي ثبوتَ كلماتِ القرآنِ وحروفِه في دماغِ حافظِ القرآنِ وقلبِه، فإنه مسطورٌ فيه حتى كأنه حين يقرؤهُ ينظرُ إليه، ولو فتّشتَ دماغَه جزءاً جزءاً لم تُشاهدْ من ذلك الخطِّ حرفاً.

حاشیہ

إحياءُ علومِ الدينِ، كتابُ ذكرِ الموتِ وما بعدَه، البابُ الثامنُ: فيما عُرِفَ من أحوالِ الموتى بالمكاشفةِ.

The memoriser's case looks built for this chapter. The whole Qur'an is "written" in his brain - so much so that as he recites he seems to be reading it off; and yet search that brain particle by particle and not one letter of the script is there. m: the record is real, complete and consultable - and lies in no material place. Ghazālī is saying it of the Preserved Tablet, and Shah Waliullah is applying it to the soul's own "scroll".

And the last sentence brings the chapter back down to the ground:

ثم كثيراً ما تتذكّرُ النفسُ ما عملتْه من خيرٍ أو شرٍّ، وتتوقّعُ جزاءَه، فيكونُ ذلك وجهاً آخرَ من وجوهِ استقرارِ عملِه، واللهُ أعلمُ.

This is the simplest evidence of all, and it is kept for last. The lofty expanse, the Covenant form, the chain of preparers - and then this: a man keeps remembering what he did, and waits for its requital. m - one of the ways a deed comes to rest, available to everyone's experience and needing no tasting at all.

8

Where people slip

Common misreading

"They spring from the root of the soul, so the deed is not the man's own." - the text's claim is about where the causes refer back to, not about choice. And it says plainly بوسطٍ أو بغيرِ وسطٍ, so the intervening links are there; by the footnote the difference is only one of regard. And the second movement is acquisition outright: إذا عملَ عملاً فأكثرَ منه.

Common misreading

"The chain of preparers is ordered, so repentance is useless." - immediately after stating the chain the text says اللهمَّ إلا and keeps two exceptions, with a verse on each: ﴿إن الحسناتِ يُذهبنَ السيئاتِ﴾ and ﴿لئن أشركتَ ليحبطنَّ عملُك﴾. The footnote even casts them as Hajj and as shirk. The chain is continuous, not locked.

Fine distinction

The subject is not every deed. The claim's first bound is exactly this: الأعمالَ التي يقصدُها الإنسانُ قصداً مؤكداً and الأخلاقَ التي هي راسخةٌ فيه. Drop that bound and the bāb makes every heedless motion a colour on the soul, which it never said.

Fine distinction

The fourth movement does not stand at the same rank as the first three. Those are in the language of reasoning and experience; this one opens with the author's own على ما وجدتُه بالذوقِ. And the footnote defines "tasting" - seeing a thing by a light obtained from the Enclosure of Holiness. Putting it level with the rest of the chapter goes past the author's own statement.

Fine distinction

Do not look for matter in the "tablet" and the "book". Half of Ghazālī's passage is that very denial - not wood, not iron, not bone, not paper. And the substitute image is not material either: the Qur'an written in a memoriser's brain.

Context

The examples of the mukhannath and the child are examples of inference. In each, someone reads ahead from a temperament - a knower in the first, a physician in the second - and each carries the same condition, إن شبَّ على مزاجِه. The bāb's claim does not rest on these examples, and no legal ruling is being stated here.


9

Going deeper

These questions stay open

  • Where is the threshold of قصداً مؤكداً? The text gives no criterion between settled intent and ordinary heedlessness - and that is exactly what decides which acts leave a "colour" and which do not.
  • What really separates the second movement from the third? In both the act leaves an effect on the soul; is the difference only one of time (a present colour against a persisting sequence), or something more?
  • If الحيّز الشاهق is the world of images, where does bāb 2's discussion - in what sense imaginal forms "exist" - bear on this? Are the forms of deeds of that same order?
  • The Covenant's form is called شعبةٌ منها, a branch of that larger form. So was the Covenant an event that passed, or one appearance of a standing fact? The text does not explain.
  • انشراحاً طبيعياً بلا اختيارٍ منه - if the entry is natural and outside choice, what is left of the angels' "writing"? Is it another name for that same natural entry, or a distinct act?
  • Ghazālī's passage is about the Preserved Tablet - that is, about decree. This bāb is about the recording of deeds. Is the author treating the two as one thing, or bringing it only as an analogy?
Where the wording comes from: this bāb's Arabic was read from Palanpuri's scan, and the footnotes with it. His edition is the better one in five places: في أولِ عمرِه (Shamela: في أول مرّة), وأما العودُ إليه (Shamela: إليها, though the footnote says plainly that the referent is "the deeds and traits"), ومنه: نُطقُ الأيدي (Shamela: ومنها), مسطورٌ مُثبَتٌ (Shamela: مسطور ومثبت), and حين يقرؤهُ (Shamela: حيث يقرأ). One place was illegible in the scan - the clause of the second exception, أو تهجمَ عليها هيئةٌ من فوقِها نظامَها - and there the wording is Shamela's; Palanpuri's own summary at that spot reads عرضت هيئةٌ غيّرت نظامَها, which is the cleaner phrasing. Check against the printed page.

▲ Contents of this bāb

Sources

This bāb's Arabic is from the scan of Palanpuri's edition, checked against the Shamela digital text.

The edition, the commentary, the searchable printings ▸

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